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In recent years the Racketeer Inspired and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO)' has been the source of much litigation and great contro-
versy. Although relatively little RICO litigation has occurred in the natu-
ral resources/environmental law area, the areas in which RICO cases
have been brought are quite diverse and include such fields as antitrust
and products liability. The purpose of this article is to illustrate RICO's
potential application in the natural resources/environmental law area. 2
This investigation will begin with a review of the statute and its judicial
interpretation and then examine some possible applications of RICO in
the natural resources/environmental law area.
I. BACKGROUND
RICO was enacted by Congress as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. It contains extensive criminal and civil remedies.
RICO's primary purpose was to provide a means for government prose-
cutors to act against criminal syndicates. 3 A secondary purpose was to
afford private citizens a remedy for injuries caused by such syndicates. 4
To accommodate this second purpose, civil RICO penalties include
treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees. 5
The general scheme of RICO is relatively simple. The plaintiff must
prove that a person, through a pattern of racketeering, directly or indi-
* Professor of Law, Western New England College. A.B., J.D. San Francisco;
LL.M., S.J.D. Michigan. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Professor
Barry Stern in preparing this article.
I. RICO makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any en-
terprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1982).
2. For detailed overviews of RICO, see Patton, Civil RICO: Statutory and Implied Ele-
ments of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 377 (1983) and Symposium, 21 CAL.
W.L. REV. 243-434 (1985).
3. As the Supreme Court recognized, "[tihe legislative history clearly demonstrates
that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for
an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots." Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
4. It should be noted that RICO expressly provides for a civil cause of action. 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Therefore, the problems of implying a cause of action from a
silent statute do not exist. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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rectly participated in an enterprise whose activities affect interstate com-
merce, 6 which injured the plaintiff's business or property by reason of
the pattern of racketeering activity. The terms "person," "enterprise,"
and "pattern of racketeering activity" are broadly defined in RICO, re-
flecting a congressional intent to provide for the wide application of the
statute to combat organized crime. Thus, the burden of proof is the civil
standard of preponderance of the evidence. 7 However, as with many
legislative "solutions," what may seem simple in theory becomes diffi-
cult in practical application. As long as only criminal RICO cases were
brought, the courts construed RICO liberally.8 Once civil suits were
brought, judicial interpretation became less expansive.9
RICO's criminal provisions have been extensively enforced from
the Act's inception. However, civil RICO remained dormant until the
late 1970's.0 In recent years, however, a growing awareness of the ease
with which common law fraud claims could be converted into civil RICO
claims has unleashed a veritable avalanche of civil RICO claims.
In the face of this proliferation of civil RICO claims, many courts
have not been receptive to civil RICO claims" 1 and have established bar-
riers to plaintiff's claims, 12 by applying RICO only to members of or-
ganized crime,' 3 by requiring a crinminal conviction as a prerequisite to a
civil suit,14 by narrowly construing the definition of "enterprise," 15 and
by limiting standing to assert RICO claims. 16 Some of these decisions
verge on impermissible judicial legislation, and in light of the recent
6. As with many areas of the law, the "effect on interstate commerce" is construed
broadly, such that it is sufficient if any of the activities of the enterprise affect interstate
commerce. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United States Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272,
1280-81 (7th Cir. 1983). For example, in United States v.Joseph, 526 F. Supp. 504 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), the court held that requisitions for supplies subsequently purchased in inter-
state commerce were sufficient to meet the jurisdictional test of RICO.
7. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-83 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59
NOTRE DAME LAw. 945, 950-51 (1984).
9. As one district court stated, "[tihe broad construction given RICO in criminal
prosecutions is simply inconsistent with the narrower construction which must be applied
in the context of a civil case." Berg v. First American Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500,
506 (D.D.C. 1984). On the other hand, some courts have made it clear that civil RICO will
receive the same construction as criminal RICO. See, e.g., Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp.
162, 164 (D.D.C. 1983); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
10. One study found only two civil RICO opinions by 1978 and only 13 by early 1981.
Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Applica-
tion of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201, 206 n.32 (1981). The two re-
ported RICO cases that existed prior to 1978 are Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) and King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
11. See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO and the Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement: Has the Second
Circuit Drawn the Net too Tight?, 60 WASH. L. REV. 461, 466 (1985). One commentator sum-
marized many of the RICO decisions as the product of "results-orientation;" that is, the
courts have ignored the statute to achieve desired results. Horn,Judicial Plague Sweeps U. S.,
NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1983, at 13.
12. See Note, Prime-Rate Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1893 (1984).
13. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court decision of Sedima, S. P.R. L. v. Imrex Co.,17 their contin-
ued viability is questionable.
Two major reasons explain this growing judicial hostility. The first
is the fear of dockets overwhelmed by RICO claims.' 8 The second rea-
son concerns RICO's antitrust analogy. Many commentators have ar-
gued that the courts should be more receptive to treble damages in
RICO cases than in antitrust cases because the purpose of RICO is to
put criminal enterprises out of business, 19 whereas in antitrust cases the
purpose is to preserve the competitive market.
This rationale, however, does not survive close scrutiny. In many
antitrust opinions, courts have shown a great reluctance to award treble
damages to "undeserving" plaintiffs who seek a windfall. 20 This ele-
ment is also present in many RICO cases, where it is clear that skillful
attorneys have cleverly drafted a RICO complaint that narrowly meets
minimal pleading requirements. In this respect, these plaintiffs may also
appear to be undeserving claimants seeking a windfall. Thus, it is un-
derstandable that many judges are unsympathetic to these RICO
claimants.
It is also important to recognize that through liberal interpretation
of statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 2 1 or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 courts have sought to further
underlying societal commitments. Although the legislative histories of
such statutes may be obfuscated, the statutes themselves reflect strong
social policies. Although there is no doubt that criminal RICO reflects a
broad public concern that organized crime represents a threat to society
and should be eliminated, such a consensus, however, does not exist
with civil RICO. Not only is there an absence of legislative history sup-
porting the view that otherwise legitimate enterprises should be subject
to draconian penalties, but there is also no evidence of a strong societal
commitment to this end. Moreover, many courts have not perceived
any broad societal interest in subjecting legitimate businesses to the
wrath of RICO.
17. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
18. Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 257, 258-59 (E.D.
Mo. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1985).
19. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Ba-
sic Concepts - Criminal and Ciil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1042 (1980). Similarly.
"RICO... is precisely designed to ruin those individuals and enterprises it is aimed at. It
is not designed to increase their efficiency or protect them from insolvency. Thus, the
rationale behind the antitrust standing concerns have no applicability." Ralston v. Cap-
per, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
20. See, e.g., Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 951
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLOSCHMID, TRADE
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 168 (5th ed. 1975) ("The theory underlying cases in
this area is not always clear and the cases themselves not entirely reconcilable. The courts
are obviously anxious to avoid windfall profits to parties who are not targeted victims of
aggressive business conduct.").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1982).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
1986]
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A. Legislative History
It is hombook law that statutory construction begins with the actual
words of the statute 23 and its legislative history. Although there are nu-
merous well-recognized canons of construction, there are numerous sit-
uations in which these canons do not work well. A few examples are
illustrative.
For instance, some statutes, such as the Clean Air Act or Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, are verbose, internally inconsistent, and
replete with legislative history sufficient to support almost any position.
Yet, the courts must make some sense of the legislative morass. Thus,
courts often hold that, of all the possible interpretations of a statute, the
agency's construction was as reasonable as the rest, or try to promote
what they believe to be the overall intent of the statute.
2 4
Another example are statutes, such as NEPA, in which the legisla-
tive history is basically non-existent because Congress enacted such leg-
islation with little debate. These statutes have generally been broadly
construed by the courts to facilitate generally recognized societal goals,
such as environmental protection. With such statutes, searching for
meaningful legislative history is akin to reading tea leaves.
A third alternative is a variation of the first two examples in that a
significant provision is added as an afterthought to a well-debated
broader measure. Although there is ample legislative history on the
overall statute, the significant amendment exists in a virtual vacuum. An
example of this type of statutory provision is the sex discrimination pro-
visions (Title VII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A search of the com-
mittee reports, hearings, and debates for evidence of legislative intent
on this provision is futile. The sex discrimination provisions were added
to the Act one day prior to House passage in an amendment proposed
by Representative Howard Smith, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee and an outspoken opponent of the Act.2 5 His intent
apparently was to prevent passage of the Civil Rights Act by confusing
the issues and by adding an unpopular section to the Act. His plan
failed, however, and debate on the sex discrimination provisions lasted
only an hour, adding little of substance to the legislative history of the
Act.
26
23. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980). As Chief Justice Burger
stated:
We have emphasized in the recent past that "[o]ur individual appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular [legislative] course ... is to be put aside in
the process of interpreting a statute .... " Our task, rather, is the narrow one of
determining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is
done our powers are exhausted.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)).
24. See generally Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87
(1975) ("We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation . . . was 'correct,' to the
extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a
complex statute such as this is the 'correct' one.").
25. See Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 395, 398.
26. Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21
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RICO is analogous to Title VII in that it too was added to a well-
debated broader measure just prior to passage and with little debate.
Criminal RICO had been extensively considered by Congress, its legisla-
tive history going back twenty years. Congress clearly intended to enact
a meaningful and effective weapon for use against organized crime. To
facilitate this end, the statute contains a "liberal construction clause,"
under which RICO is to be liberally construed to effect its objectives.
2 7
Civil RICO, on the other hand, was added as an "afterthought" by the
House Judiciary Committee as an amendment to the Senate version of
the bill, which did not contain a civil cause of action. Accordingly, the
legislative history of civil RICO is relatively scant. Due to the dearth of
legislative history on civil RICO, the courts have struggled with its inter-
pretation and have yet to reach a consensus. Rarely has Congress en-
acted such a sweeping piece of legislation with such a modicum of
legislative history.
If civil RICO is construed in accordance with the "liberal construc-
tion" clause, almost all forms of "garden variety fraud" can be encom-
passed by the statute. In fact, under liberalized pleading requirements
almost any civil action could conceivably be pled under civil RICO. As
one court has noted, "[a] slavish literalism would escort into federal
courts through RICO what traditionally have been civil actions in state
courts."
28
Although the statutory language appears clear on its face, some
courts have found it difficult to apply. As one court has noted, RICO
seems to be "constructed on the model of a treasure hunt."'29 Another
court, in limiting RICO, relied on the "familiar rule that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because [it
is] not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
'30
Because of the fear of federalizing state common law claims and the
fear of "flooding" federal dockets with RICO claims, restrictions to limit
RICO's application have been created. As one commentator has noted,
"Ujudicial resistance to the use of RICO in civil litigation has arisen, in
large part, because of the apparent inconsistency between the narrow
spirit and the broad letter of the statute."
'3 '
VAND. L. REV. 484, 491 (1968); Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778, 790 (1965).
27. RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose." Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). This statement of purpose and construction is,
of course, contrary to the normal rule that criminal statutes are to be narrowly construed.
See, e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973).
28. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D.
Mass. 1982).
29. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984). Another court
noted that RICO is not a model of legislative draftsmanship. Salisbury v. Chapman, 527 F.
Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
30. Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also
Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984) (quoting United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)).
31. Moran, Pleading A Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting Precedent and the
Practitioner's Dilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731, 732 (1984). Similarly, one judge wrote: "I have
1986] 539
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Many courts, however, have rejected any distinction between civil
and criminal RICO. For these courts, the remedy to any overbreadth in
civil RICO lies with Congress.3 2 The Eighth Circuit has led the way in
positing that it is not the role of the courts to arbitrarily limit RICO by
stating that:
[i]nsofar as the door of the federal courthouse is similarly
opened by RICO in a civil context, we are cautioned by the
Supreme Court that broad Congressional action should not be
restricted by the courts in the name of federalism. It is beyond
our authority to restrict the reach of the statute.
33
Other courts as well have found civil RICO to be unambiguous and have
concluded that, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to
the contrary, the language of the statute will be regarded as conclu-
sive.3 4 Furthermore, some courts have been hesitant to construe RICO




One of the critical provisions of RICO has to do with the conduct of
an "enterprise." An "enterprise" is broadly defined to include "any in-
dividual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal
entity." 3 6 This definition is so broad as to include almost any organiza-
tion,3 7 ranging from labor unions3 8 to governmental bodies.3 9 Pursu-
concluded that Congress did not intend to federalize every tort or breach of contract in
business transactions involving the use of the mails." Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603
F. Supp. 624, 628 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
32. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983); Callan v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
33. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. 484 U.S.
1009 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus. Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 412 (8th Cir.
1984).
35. As stated in Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984):
Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned to
avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime might
crawl to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal
treble-damage proceedings - the price of eliminating all possible loopholes. We
must abide by Congress's decision, made at a time of less sensitivity than today to
the workload pressures on the federal courts and to the desirability of maintain-
ing a reasonable balance between state and federal courts, however much we may
regret not only the burdens that the decision has cast on the federal courts but
also the displacement of state tort law into the federal courts that it has brought
about.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). In turn, the term "person" is broad enough to in-
clude not only natural persons, but also the estate of a deceased. See State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
37. See generally United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.l (4th Cir. 1980)
(individuals involved in a prostitution ring constituted an enterprise); United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (illegal gambling ring constituted an enter-
prise), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Joseph, 526 F. Supp. 504, 507
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (an enterprise may consist of one person).
38. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981).
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ant to this definition, even a mere association of individuals may qualify
as an "enterprise. ' 40 For example, an allegation that defendants were
in a joint real estate venture and directed its business relations with
plaintiff over a significant period of time constituted the existence of an
"enterprise." '4 1 However, in the oft-cited Eighth Circuit opinion of Ben-
nett v. Berg,4 2 the court held that the:
Mere participation in the predicate offenses listed in RICO,
even in conjunction with a RICO enterprise, may be insufficient
to support a RICO cause of action. A defendant's participation
must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise,
which ordinarily will require some participation in the opera-
tion or management of the enterprise itself.
Yet, the unlawful racketeering activity need not be part of the day-to-day
business operations of the enterprise. 4 3 It is sufficient that the enter-
prise was used as a front for illegal activities. 44
Thus, the federal courts have broadly construed the word "enter-
prise,"'4 5 based both upon the liberal construction clause and upon the
phrase "any enterprise." To date, the major case construing "enter-
prise" is United States v. Turkette,4 6 which involved a defendant participat-
ing in an association that, ab initio, performed only illegal acts and had
not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise. The de-
fendant claimed RICO was inapplicable to illegitimate enterprises and
the court of appeals agreed.4 7 The Supreme Court, however, unani-
mously reversed the decision, holding that the term "enterprise" en-
compasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.48 The Court
39. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1072 (1982).
40. As the Supreme Court has recognized in the leading case of United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981): "There is no restriction upon the associations em-
braced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact."
41. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
42. 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983).
43. Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (quoting United States v.
DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
44. See United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979).
45. See Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962 and
1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 104-05 (1981). See generally Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F.
Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (limited partnership); Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (decedent's estate); Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F.
Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (city council); State v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245
(D. Md. 1980) (city agency).
46. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
47. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980).
48. "In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the
statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to
only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltra-
tion of legitimate business." 452 U.S. at 590 (emphasis in original). The Court cited sev-
eral excerpts of legislative history in support of its opinion. A typical excerpt from a
Senate Report reads:
What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that will deal
not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those
individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Na-
1986]
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concluded that "neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its
application to legitimate enterprises." 4 9 Although the Court noted the
presence of the liberal construction clause, it did not base its decision on
it.
5 0
Two important constraints exist, however, with respect to the scope
of the term "enterprise." First, several circuits have held that the culpa-
ble person must be an entity distinct and separate from the "enterprise"
with which it associates. 5 1 Thus, a person or entity cannot be both a
defendant and an "enterprise." Second, RICO does not hold the enter-
prise itself liable, but only those who seek to participate in the affairs of
the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
5 2
C. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
The key phrase in section 1962(c) is a "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity." Under the statute, "racketeering activity" includes "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year,"153 as well as any other act indictable under a series of
federal criminal statutes, such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities
fraud. 54 These acts of racketeering are usually referred to as "predicate
acts."
55
RICO requires the commission of two predicate acts within a ten
year period. 5 6 Most courts have held that predicate acts need not be
related to each other, to a common pattern of illegal activity, 57 or to the
day-to-day business operations of the "enterprise." '5 8 For example, the
Fifth Circuit 59 has held that no interrelationship had to be shown be-
tion. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the
attack must take place on all available fronts.
Id. at 591-92 (emphasis supplied in opinion).
49. Id. at 587.
50. Id.
51. B. F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd 105 S. Ct. 3291
(1985); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir.
1982). Contra United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982).
52. See, e.g., Bays v. Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1982). In United
States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court construed RICO to require the "enterprise" to exist
separately from the pattern of racketeering activity, but also noted that in appropriate
cases, proof of the enterprise's existence may coalesce with proof of the "pattern of activ-
ity." 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (1982).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (1982).
55. RICO incorporates by reference 24 types of federal crimes and eight types of state
felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Hawkins v.
United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
58. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
59. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir.), reh g denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th
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tween the predicate acts because:
The graveness of the offense . . . is the conduct of an enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Thus,
the Act does require a type of relatedness: the two or more
predicate crimes must be related to the affairs of the enterprise
but need not otherwise be related to each other.
On the other hand, one court has held that multiple bribes pursuant
to a vote-rigging plan for a cable T.V. franchise did not constitute dis-
tinct predicate acts. 60 The court required a series of schemes to defraud
under the mail fraud statute and not just a single scheme with multiple
mailings. More significantly, dicta in a recent Supreme Court decision
supports a more narrow reading of "pattern" than that which the major-
ity of courts have given it.
6 1
RICO, however, does not prohibit the predicate acts, but instead
prohibits three specified actions: (1) the legal acquisitions of or invest-
ment in an enterprise with money derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity;6 2 (2) the illegal acquisition of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering;63 or, (3) participation in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 64 The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of
RICO is to eliminate the "infiltration of legitimate businesses" by indi-
viduals who have obtained investment capital from a "pattern of racke-
teering activity."' 65 Thus, the purpose of the provision is to prevent
"racketeers" from using their ill-begotten gains to diversify into legiti-
mate businesses.
The language of RICO makes it clear that the statute is directed at
conduct or acts (the predicate offenses) and not at status; that is, mem-
bership in organized crime.6 6 The reason for this focus is simple. It was
feared that severe constitutional problems would arise if the statute at-
tempted to strike at membership in an organization. It was thought im-
Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Hawkins v. Hill, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); see also United States v.
Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 540 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Elliot).
60. Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
see also United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("Pattern" should be
construed as requiring more than accidental or unrelated instances of proscribed
behavior.).
61. In a significant footnote the Court stated:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a
pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5) (emphasis
added), not that it "means two such acts." The implication is that while two acts
are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of
anything do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports the
view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern ....
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985) (emphasis in
original).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
65. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591-93.
66. See generally Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1063 ("We are convinced that the better reasoned
approach . . . rejects any attempt to interpret [civil] RICO as creating a status offense
aimed only at organized crime in any colloquial sense of that phrase .... ").
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possible to define the concept of "organized crime" with the precision
necessary to avoid constitutional challenges, such as "void for vague-
ness." 67 Congress was also very concerned about the constitutional
problems involved in singling out a specific ethnic group as the target of
a statute as well as the difficulties involved in defining a nebulous con-
cept such as "organized crime."68 These problems were thought not to
exist with a statute directed at conduct. Thus, the rationale for the spec-
ified predicate acts was that these offenses are characteristic of organ-
ized crimes. 69 However, one consequence of using conduct offenses as
a statutory focus is that the statute reaches beyond organized crime
members. This possibility was recognized by Senator McClellan who
noted that, "it is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches
most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not in-
clude offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized
crime as well." 70 Consequently, RICO makes unlawful racketeering ac-
tivities, regardless of who the participant is, thereby raising the issue of
whether RICO should be used only against the Vito Corleones of the
world or against any "enterprise" that has engaged in the requisite
predicate acts.
Broadly construed, RICO can apply to traditional organized crime
activities, such as loan sharking, or, depending upon the applicable state
laws, school children pitching pennies. 7 1 Although criminal RICO cases
are constrained by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 72 no such
limits exist in civil RICO cases, where the pot-of-gold (treble damages)
lying at the end of the rainbow serves as a powerful magnet to plaintiffs
67. See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1106-09 (1982).
68. It should be noted that at one point in the RICO deliberation, Representative
Biaggi proposed an amendment which would limit RICO's application to the "Mafia" and
"La Cosa Nostra," and also required that any defendant be of Italian ancestry. 116 CONG.
REC. 35,343 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970) (statement ofRep. Biaggi). Constitutional objections
were raised by Representatives Celler and Poff. Id. at 35,344.
69. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liber-
ties?, 46 NOTRE DAME Law. 55 (1970).
70. Id. at 143. In addition, Representative Poff, floor manager of the bill stated, the
"concept of organized criminal activity is broader in scope than the concept of organized
crime; it is meant to include any criminal activity collectively undertaken .... S. REP. No.
30, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 35,293 (1970).
71. Congressional opposition to RICO was limited. Those who did oppose the bill
included Congressmen Conyers, Mikva and Ryan, who stated:
Indeed, another section of this title - section 1964(c) - provides invitation for
disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaged
in interstate commerce by authorizing private damage suits. A competitor need
only raise the claim that his rival has derived gains from two games of poker, and,
because this title prohibits even the "indirect use" of such gains - a provision
with tremendous outreach - litigation is begun. What a protracted, expensive
trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity may well accomplish - de-
struction of the rival's business.
H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4083.
72. Occasionally, courts have warned against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking
RICO even in the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 64-65 (2d
Cir. 1983); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1980).
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and their lawyers. The reality is that civil RICO has been used only
against "legitimate enterprises." The reason for this situation is that in
criminal RICO cases the prosecution is undertaken by the federal gov-
ernment, which usually uses several sources for evidence and provides
various degrees of protection for these witnesses and informants. In a
civil RICO case, however, the claimant would have to proceed directly
against the organized crime member, an action which would not be con-
ducive to the claimant's life expectancy.
D. Mail and Wire Fraud
The inclusion of mail fraud and wire fraud among the predicate
RICO acts creates the potential to federalize much of the common law
fraud under the RICO rubric because the mail and wire fraud statutes
are the broadest statutes of general applicability incorporated in
RICO.7 3 Almost every significant commercial transaction involves use
of the mails, telephone, or interstate wires. Wire fraud can occur, for
example, when a telephone conversation takes place in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud. 74 Therefore, RICO violations could conceivably be
alleged in every major transaction with an unsatisfied party. The reality
has been that many civil RICO actions allege a pattern of racketeering
activity predicated upon mail or wire fraud, such as use of the mails to
send fraudulent statements. As a federal district court noted in Warner
Communications Co. v. Murdock,7 5 the broad scope of RICO has created
the risk of abusive private enforcement because most garden-variety
fraud claims can be creatively converted into a facially viable RICO
claim.
The vast majority of cases involving mail fraud require only two ele-
ments for recovery: (1) a scheme to defraud 76 and (2) the mailing of a
letter or other material for the purpose of executing the scheme. 77 The
scheme to defraud consists of a pattern of behavior that must be calcu-
lated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension. 78
73. By way of illustration, the mail fraud statute prohibits any "scheme or artifice to
defraud." 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). It has thus been extended to include such a myriad of
activities as kickbacks, political corruption, illicit divorce mills, insurance frauds, and con-
sumer fraud. See Comment, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 237, 238
(1975); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); De Mier v. United States, 616
F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir.
1972).
74. See, e.g., Furman v. Cirrito, 578 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also
United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 411 (6th Cir) (interstate phone calls to obtain
money for illegal scheme), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
75. 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1497 (D. Del. 1984).
76. Congress never defined, for purposes of the mail fraud statute, the phrase
"scheme or artifice to defraud." However, as one court pointed out, "[t]he law does not
define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human
ingenuity." Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687
(1941).
77. See, e.g., Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1984); Ep-
stein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 1984).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1972); Irwin v.
United States, 338 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965).
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The existence of a fraudulent intent, that is, a "conscious knowing intent
to defraud," is part of this requirement. In theory, plaintiff must show a
specific intent to defraud on defendant's part. 79 The reality, however, is
that courts recognize the difficulties of establishing a subjective intent
and have allowed the requisite intent to be inferred from the totality of
the circumstances. 80 It is also generally agreed that an offense occurs
even if the scheme or artifice to defraud was not intended to affect the
victim's money or property.8 1
Consequently, most courts construe the phrase "scheme or artifice
to defraud" very broadly in furtherance of the statute's perceived policy
of prohibiting the misuse of the mails to further fraudulent enterprises
8 2
and "[t]he result has been to include within the term many schemes in-
volving deception, such as bribery, 83 which employ the mails in their
execution, if they are contrary to public policy and fail to measure up to
accepted moral standards and notions of honesty and fair play."
84
Thus, for many courts the outer limits of the term are such that "any
scheme contrary to public policy that involves deception can be prose-
cuted under the mail fraud statute if the mails are used in the execution
of the scheme." 85 Therefore, violations can include breach of a fiduci-
ary duty owed an employer 8 6 or government corruption involving use of
the mails or wires.
8 7
79. United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Rhoads, 617 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1980); Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665, (5th Cir. 1967); Gusow v. United States, 347 F.2d 755, 756
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1965).
81. See generally United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) (prosecution for use of
mails to further vote fraud scheme stated an offense even though scheme was not intended
to affect money or property); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976)
(political corruption involving the governor of Maryland), supplemented by 415 F. Supp.
1025, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1976).
82. Cf. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1895) (Court rejected argu-
ment that the term "scheme or artifice to defraud," as used in the statute, was limited to
common law concepts of fraud and false pretenses). See generally Note, A Survey of the Mail
Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 673 (1978) (Offenses prosecuted under the mail fraud
statute have not been limited to common fraud situations. Instead, they have ranged from
divorce mills granting decrees of questionable validity to bribery of public officials, as well
as ballot tampering and pyramid schemes.).
83. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362.
84. Id. at 1360. See, e.g., United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1980)
("the measure of fraud is its departure from moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair
play and candid dealings in the general life of members of society"); see also Gregory v.
United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958).
85. See also United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
891 (1972). In Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
818 (1962), the Eighth Circuit stated:
[W]e recognize that the forms of fraud are as multifarious as human ingenuity can
devise; that courts consider it difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an exact,
definite, and all-inclusive definition thereof; and that each case must be deter-
mined on its own facts. In general, and in its generic sense, fraud comprises all
acts, conduct, omissions, and concealment involving breach of legal or equitable
duty and resulting in damage to another.
86. See, e.g., Bradford v. United States, 129 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1942); Shushan v.
United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
87. See Note, Government Corruption and Civil RICO, Providing Compensation for Intangible
Losses, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1530 (1983).
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It should be noted at this point that because mail fraud is included
as a racketeering activity, the mail fraud statute prohibits the act of mail-
ing, instead of a scheme to defraud. 8 8 Consequently, a violation of
RICO can be established by proving two mailings in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud. For example, in a case involving alleged bribery of
the director of a redevelopment authority, a district court concluded
that each act of mailing constituted a separate offense. The court stated
that "a single ongoing scheme to defraud by obtaining bribes or kick-
backs, which involves a series of unlawful acts, can establish a "pattern"
for purposes of RICO, and that it is not necessary to establish two or
more totally independent criminal acts." 89 The minority view was ex-
pressed by Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie,90 which required a se-
ries of schemes to defraud under the mail fraud statutes and not just a
single scheme with multiple mailings.
In light of the liberal interpretation of "fraud," the relative ease of
establishing a pattern of racketeering activity through multiple use of
the mails or wires and the liberal pleading requirements of the federal
procedural rules, civil RICO claims are not difficult to frame and plead.
Consequently, almost all "garden variety" common law fraud claims can
now be pled as civil RICO claims.9 1
One important caveat, however, is that Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 9(b) requires that in "all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be be stated with
particularity."' 92 Thus, it has been held that general allegations of a
scheme or artifice to defraud are insufficient to meet the pleading re-
quirements. Therefore, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege the time,
place, and contents of the misrepresentation relied upon. Conclusion-
ary allegations of a conspiracy have been held to be inadequate.
9 3
A more liberal interpretation of Rule 9(b), however, was announced
by the Seventh Circuit in Tomera v. Gait,9 4 where the court held that Rule
88. Weatherspoon v. United States, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
89. United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 200 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also Illinois
Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985) (state was successfully able to
argue a RICO claim based upon the mailing of nine separate fraudulent state sales tax
returns over a nine month period).
90. 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
91. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1356, noted that Congress could avoid RICO's application to
"garden variety" fraud claims by removing mail and securities fraud from the list of racke-
teenng activities.
92. FED. R. Cxv. P. 9(b). For many courts, this requirement means plaintiff must, at a
minimum, allege the time, place, and contents of the misrepresentation upon which he
relied. See, e.g., Bender, 749 F.2d at 1216.
93. See, e.g., Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1062; Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus.,
590 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1984). It has also been held that where there are
allegations of a fraudulent scheme with multiple defendants, the complaint must inform
each defendant of the specific fraudulent acts that constitute the basis of the action against
-the particular defendant. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
94. 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1975). Part of the reason for the Seventh Circuit's
view is that the strict pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) clashes with the liberal pleading
policy of the federal rules. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1359.
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9(b) was satisfied by a "brief sketch of how [a] fraudulent scheme oper-
ated, when and where it occurred, and the participants." Several more
recent opinions have adopted this liberal interpretation of Rule 9(b). 95
E. Remedies
1. Damages
The major penalty of RICO, which makes it so attractive to private
plaintiffs, is the awarding of treble damages and reasonable attorney's
fees.9 6 The purpose of this provision is not only to compensate the in-
jured victim, but also to significantly reduce the power of the criminal
organization. The prospect of treble damages at trial, accompanied by
the prospect of a relatively quick and advantageous settlement, has been
an attractive allure to plaintiffs.
One significant limitation, however, exists with RICO - it is based
on the premise that it was "designed to eliminate pernicious commercial
activities." Therefore, damages should be limited to business or prop-
erty damages: a limitation which effectively precludes any recovery for
physical injuries or emotional distress.
9 7
2. Injunctive Relief
One of the most important RICO remedies, particularily in the nat-
ural resources context, is the possibility of injunctive relief. At present,
however, injunctive relief is generally not a viable remedy under
RICO.9 8
Under section 1964(a), federal district courts have jurisdiction to
95. See, e.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 195 S. Ct. 1179 (1985), which held the rule does not require
"date, time or place" allegations, and that plaintiffs "are free to use alternative means of
injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud."
Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Ill. 1984) held plaintiff
"need only set forth the basic outline of the scheme, who made what misrepresentation
and the general time and place of such misrepresentations." See also Finn v. Davis, 602 F.
Supp. 801 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
96. There is limited authority for the proposition that plaintiff is not entitled to attor-
ney's fees if plaintiff settled his claim with defendant. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984).
97. See, e.g., Callan v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see
also Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., 596 F. Supp. 988, 991 (D. N.J. 1984) ("RICO was
designed to eliminate pernicious commercial activities.") (emphasis in original). Allegations
of injury to business reputation and customer goodwill, and loss of revenues satisfies the
injury requirement of RICO. Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Burts, 612 F. Supp. 441, 444 (D.
Md. 1984).
In the recent Supreme Court decision of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct.
3275, 3285-86, (1985), the Court stated plaintiff "only has standing if, and can only re-
cover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct
constituting the violation." It is also important to note that Justice Marshall's dissent in
Sedima agreed with the majority on this point. Id. at 3303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. See generally Johnson, Preditors Rights: Multiple Remedies for Wall Street Sharks Under the
Securities Laws and RICO, 10 J. CORP. L. 3 (1984); Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in
Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME LAw. 945, 953 (1984) (Commentators, how-
ever, argue for a construction of section 1964(c) allowing a private plaintiff equitable
relief.).
[Vol. 63:3
RICO IN NATURAL RESOURCE LA W
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 through the exercise of
broad equitable powers, including divestitures, reorganizations and dis-
solutions.9 9 This section clearly applies to cases brought by the United
States Attorney General, but is silent on the issue of private equitable
relief. Similarly, section 1964(b) authorizes courts to "enter such re-
straining orders or prohibitions, or [to] take such other actions, includ-
ing the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem
proper" in civil actions brought by the United States under RICO, but is
also silent on the issue of private relief.'0 0 Thus, in light of the broad
list of express RICO remedies, the absence of private injunctive relief is
glaring.
This omission, however, is not an accidental oversight. Although
civil RICO legislative history is scarce, there is clear evidence that Con-
gress specifically intended to preclude private equitable relief.'0 1 Con-
sequently, several courts have denied injunctive relief.'0 2 Yet, a few
courts have allowed injunctive relief by exercising the inherent tradi-
tional equitable powers of the federal courts. 103 Another argument sup-
porting the use of injunctive relief is based on interpreting the language
of RICO in light of the development of parallel language in the Sherman
Act.
After the Supreme Court twice construed the Sherman Act to pre-
clude a private antitrust plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief, ' 0 4 sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act was subsequently enacted to expressly
provide for private injunctive relief. The argument, therefore, is that
"[h]ad Congress intended a private RICO plaintiff to be able to obtain
injunctive relief, it surely would have avoided language that had previ-
ously been held by the Supreme Court not to permit such relief."'
10 5
Several commentators have also argued that injunctive relief should
be allowed private plaintiffs in civil RICO cases. Their arguments are
based on the broad intent of Congress to curb organized crime as well
as on the application of the liberal construction clause. 10 6
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982).
101. An amendment was offered on the floor of Congress to allow injunctive relief by
private parties. It was sent back to committee. See S. REP. No. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Pofl) (quoted in DeMent v. Abbott Capital
Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378, 1383 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
102. Dan River, Inc. v. Cann, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Affiliated Fin.
Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1984); DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F.
Supp. 1378 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84
(N.D. Ill. 1983).
103. Chambers Dev. Co., 590 F. Supp. at 1540-41; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), afftd, 730 F.2d 1905 (2d Cir. 1984);
Marshall Field & Co. v. Cahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
104. See Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904); Paine Lumber Co. v.
Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917). To overrule that authority, Congress expressly amended the
antitrust laws to allow injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
105. DeMent, 589 F. Supp. at 1383.
106. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 19, at 1037-38 & n. 133; see, e.g., Note, supra note 98,
at 953.
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F. The Organized Crime Defense
The most obvious defense to a RICO claim is that the defendant is
not linked to "organized crime" in any way. This defense is premised
on RICO's purpose of being a tool against organized crime and has
been approvingly recognized by a few district courts. For example, in
Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 107 the district court held that a defendant must
be connected in some way to organized crime as a prerequisite to a
plaintiff stating a claim under RICO. Barr noted that the legislative his-
tory made frequent reference to "racketeers," "organized crime" and
"organized crime families" as well as to the "syndicate," the "Mafia"
and the "Cosa Nostra."' 10 8 Based upon this legislative history, the court
concluded RICO was not aimed at legitimate business organizations, but
instead at the "society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the
control of the American people and their governments." 109 The court's
conclusion is supported by legislative history that indicates that RICO's
sanctions and remedies would be used primarily against individuals en-
gaged in organized crime." 10
In Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. , another federal district court
required an allegation that the "racketeering" enterprise was organized
solely for criminal purposes. The court stated that there was "no evi-
dence that Congress intended such a drastic alteration in the civil reme-
dies available to victims of garden variety fraud" in enacting section
1964.112
However, the vast majority of cases, including every appellate deci-
sion on point, have rejected the organized crime defense.' 13 For most
courts, the persuasive factor is that Congress acted against conduct (the
107. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). It should be noted that on the merits, the court
characterized the RICO claim as "specious, frivolous, and without merit." Id. at 113. Barr
involved the customers of a telephone answering service suing it for fixing the price of its
services and wilfully overcharging the customers. RICO was alleged based upon mail




110. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 18,945 (1970) (re-
marks of Senator McClellan). In Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736,
747 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the court stated, "it seems reasonably clear that the limit of the Act's
application is to entities involved with 'organized crime' or activities within the penumbra
of that phrase."
111. 591 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
112. Id. at 588. See American Say. Ass'n v. Sierra Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 586 F. Supp.
888, 889 (D. Colo. 1984) (footnote omitted); see also Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F.
Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984), which looked to the intent of RICO to eliminate organ-
ized crime, and thus subscribed to the familiar Supreme Court rule that "a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because it is not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its maker."
113. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1985); Owl Constr.
Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1984); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1008 (1984); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050, reh g denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
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predicate acts) and not status (organized crime); therefore, the plain
words of the statute control. Consequently, anyone who has engaged in
the proscribed conduct should be liable. As the Eighth Circuit noted in
Bennett v. Berg, 1 4 "[t]he better reasoned approach is one which rejects
any attempt to interpret RICO as creating a status offense aimed only at
organized crime in any colloquial sense of the phrase .... [RICO] is
aimed more broadly at organized criminal activity as well."' 15 The ra-
tionale of Barr has also been rejected by several commentators.' 1 6
G. Standing: The Racketeering Enterprise Injury Requirement
The most difficult and controversial aspect of RICO is the question
of standing. On its face, RICO explicitly provides standing for "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation ...
may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." 1 17 Because of the express lan-
guage of this provision, plaintiffs do not have to confront the problem of
inferring a civil cause of action1 18 or the traditional concepts of
standing.' 19
Many courts, however, have construed standing narrowly in civil
RICO cases in order to limit their numbers. The most frequently used
method has been to require plaintiffs to plead what has been termed a
"racketeering enterprise injury" or a "racketeering injury." Whether or
not there must be a "racketeering injury" has been one of the most hotly
debated aspects of RICO. The issue arose because RICO does not de-
fine "injury" or "racketeering injury." Consequently, these terms have
been subject to extensive judicial interpretation. The argument for im-
posing the condition is based on two premises. First, that legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress did not intend to create a new set of
remedies for injuries resulting from offenses that traditionally have been
the province of state tort law or federal securities law. Second, that leg-
islative history also indicates that Congress was primarily concerned
with the disruption of free competition by organized crime.
In the oft-cited case of North Barrington Development, Inc. v. Fan-
slow, 120 a federal district court held that a plaintiff must allege some type
of "competitive injury" to his business. The court held that "[t]he pur-
l 14. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982). Bennett involved a suit by residents of a retirement
community against the owners and officers of the community for fraud.
115. Id. at 1063.
116. See, e.g., Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations", 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9-10
(1978); Note, Putting a Halt to judicial Limitations on Civil RICO, 52 UMKC L. REV. 56, 60
(1983).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
118. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
119. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
120. 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. 111. 1980).
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pose of section 1964(c) was not to transform state law violations into
federal violations, but to prevent interference with free competition
... ." In short, plaintiff must allege how it was injured competitively by
the RICO violation in order to state a cause of action under section
1964(c).1 2 1 Under this approach, injuries resulting solely from the
predicate acts might only provide a state law or pre-existing federal
criminal law claim, but not a civil RICO claim.
The analogy to antitrust law evident in the North Barrington opinion
is based on the fact that the civil remedies of RICO are modeled on
section four of the Clayton Act, which provides a private cause of action
in treble damages for "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
.... ,"122 The argument continues that because standing limitations ex-
ist under the Clayton Act, similar restrictions should apply under
RICO. 1
2 3
The antitrust case most frequently cited in support of this argument
is Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. ,124 where the Supreme Court
held that because of the "by reason of" language in the antitrust laws, a
plaintiff must prove an antitrust-type injury; that is, injury reflecting the
ant.-compettive effects of th violation, not just any injury proximately
caused by the antitrust violations. Under this "competitive injury" re-
quirement, plaintiff has to establish both an injury to his business or
property and that the injury was caused by a violation of the antitrust
laws.
Therefore, by analogy, standing under RICO should similarly be
limited to injuries inflicted by a rackeetering enterprise. This proposi-
tion was set out in the case of Landmark Savings & Loan Association v.
Rhoades:
What is required for standing to bring a civil RICO damage
action is an allegation that the plaintiff has suffered a "racke-
teering enterprise injury .... " A rackeetering enterprise injury
might occur, for example, if a civil RICO defendant's ability to
harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money from a
pattern of racketeering activity into the enterprise.'
25
This view also limits recovery to persons injured in their business, as
opposed to in a personal capacity.
12 6
One major problem with the "racketeering injury" requirement is
121. Id. at 210-11.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
123. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Sec.
Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
124. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
125. 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
126. One effect of the "racketeering injury" requirement is to reject claims based on
consumer fraud. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D.
Mass. 1982). One commentator argues that based on the plain language of the statute and
legislative history, "treble damages should be available only to those who are injured com-
petitively through the distinctive involvement in the racketeering acts by an interstate en-
terprise." Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO. Sections 1962 and
1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 103 (1981).
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that it has never been precisely defined. One court critical of the re-
quirement has aptly described it as a "slippery concept whose definition
has eluded even those courts professing to recognize it." ' 1 2 7 In lieu of
defining "racketeering injury," two courts have echoed Justice Stewart's
famous definition of obscenity by stating that even if they could not de-
fine it, 1 2 8 they would know a "racketeering injury" when they saw
one.12 9 Nevertheless, in spite of whatever semantical difficulties may ex-
ist with defining the requisite "racketeering injury," it may be viewed as
an injury to competition.'
30
Most other courts and commentators, however, have rejected the
"racketeering enterprise injury" requirement, basing their rejection on
the plain words of the statute. 131 Thus, the majority view is that a plain-
tiff states a RICO claim even if he suffers injury only from the predicate
acts.
Moreover, the offered analogy to the antitrust law is not very per-
suasive. When initially drafted, RICO was proposed as an amendment
to the antitrust laws. However, the ABA Section on Antitrust Law stud-
ied the proposed legislation and reported back to Congress that the
maintenance of competition, which is the goal of antitrust laws, could
not properly be adapted to the goal of curtailing organized crime's influ-
ence over business. Part of the section's comments emphasized that an-
titrust concepts, such as standing and proximate cause, would create
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles for persons seeking treble
damages under RICO. '
3 2
In the antitrust context, courts have narrowly construed standing
requirements or imposed other restrictions on recovery, in part to pre-
vent a "windfall" for the plaintiff.13 3 Even though the antitrust laws
clearly prescribe treble damages, judges have not always been willing to
invoke this remedy when they perceive the plaintiff to be undeserving.
However, with respect to RICO, the congressional intent was clearly to
put racketeering organizations out of business.' 3 4 Because of this socie-
tal consensus, this determination may help to explain why standing re-
quirements in RICO cases are more liberally construed than in antitrust
cases.
127. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir.), va-
cated, 105 S. Ct. 355 (1984).
128. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184. 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.. concurring).
129. See Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D.
Or. 1984); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
130. In addition, one court has held that "to establish injury 'by reason of a pattern of
racketeering injury,' a plaintiff must, at least, demonstrate that the existence or effects of
such pattern - or some unfair advantage derived therefrom - either caused or in some
material way contributed to the injury claimed." Margolis v. Republic Nat'l Bank of New
York, 585 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
131. The overwhelming rejection of the competitive injury requirement was led by the
Seventh Circuit in Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1357-58.
132. S. REP. No. 2048-49, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6994-95 (1969).
133. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
134. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 81 (1969); see also Note, Prime-Rate
Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1900-01 (1984).
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II. THE SEDIMA/HAROCO REDUX
A. Differing Interpretations of Civil RICO
A trilogy of Second Circuit cases are representative of the narrow
approach that some courts have taken towards civil RICO. In the first,
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,135 a two-to-one majority dismissed a civil
RICO claim because the defendant had not been criminally convicted of
a predicate violation under the Act. 136 In addition, the court held that
the plaintiff must show injury "by reason of" a violation of RICO; that
is, an "injury different in kind from that occurring as a result of the
predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts,
but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."'
3 7
The court's restrictive interpretation of RICO was influenced by
several factors. First, the court expressed concern about the extraordi-
nary lengths to which civil plaintiffs have brought garden-variety fraud
cases under RICO.' 38 The court in Sedima also noted the "clanging si-
lence" of legislative historyl39 behind civil RICO. Judge Oakes, writing
for the majority, concluded that Congress was unaware of RICO's possi-
ble implications and noted that "[i]f Congress had intended to provide a
federal forum for plaintiffs for so many common law wrongs, it would at
least have discussed it."' 40 He then observed that there was no evi-
dence that Congress intended to create such a broad civil cause of
action. 141
After determining that RICO was enacted to fight organized
crime, 14 2 Judge Oakes concluded that standing should be limited to
those suffering a "racketeering injury." Upon this conclusion, the court
further held that "RICO was intended not simply to provide additional
remedies for already compensable injuries, but rather to provide added
remedies and procedures to fight certain specific kinds of organized
criminality." 1
4 3
Commenting on the limited legislative history of the Act, the court
noted that the private cause of action was added "in the House as an
afterthought, subsequent to the inclusion of the liberal construction
clause in the Senate version of the bill."' 14 4 For this reason, the court
135. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). Although, as discussed,
the Supreme Court has rendered the Sedima/Haroco debate moot, it is critical to look at
these appellate decisions to fully comprehend the judicial underpinnings of RICO
litigation.
136. Id. at 496.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 487. The court noted that civil RICO had not been used against mobsters,
but against registered and legitimate enterprises, such as American Express, E.F. Hutton &
Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns & Co., and Merrill Lynch. See infra notes 199-202
and accompanying text.
139. 741 F.2d at 492.
140. Id. at 492.
141. Id. at 487.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 494.
144. Id. at 502-03.
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observed, the statute cannot be viewed as a symmetric whole.145
The court in Sedima, a case that arose out of a claim of securities
fraud, explained the criminal conviction requirement as follows:
A person who is charged in a civil case with securities fraud (for
example, by way of willful misrepresentation in a proxy state-
ment), proof of which is by a preponderance of the evidence,
can surely not be said to have committed "an offense," convic-
tion of which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, with
all of the traditional constitutional and other safeguards.1
46
Judge Cardamone vigorously dissented in Sedima, arguing that a prior
criminal conviction is not required by either the statute or its legislative
history. 147
In the second opinion of the trilogy, Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 14 8
Judge Kearse construed the statutory phrase "person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" to require a
plaintiff to show a proprietary type of damage, 149 a causal connection
between the prohibited conduct and the proprietary injury, 150 and an
injury caused by a RICO violation instead of by a defendant's predicate
acts.' 5 1 Judge Kearse reasoned that section 1962 does not itself pro-
hibit the predicate acts that constitute racketeering activity.152
Judge Cardamone again dissented, complaining that the majority
opinion "has pulled the teeth from the statute and reduced its effective-
ness nearly to zero .... ',153 He also noted that "[i]f civil RICO does not
provide a remedy on the facts of this totally outrageous case, it never
will.' 1 5 4 The third opinion of the trilogy, Furman v. Cirito,155 was au-
thored by Judge Cardamone, who felt obligated to follow the earlier
opinions of Sedima and Bankers Trust.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc. v. American
National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 156 held that a special "racketeering
enterprise injury," separate and distinct from the injuries caused by the
acts that constitute the pattern of racketeering, was not a prerequisite to
asserting a treble damages claim under RICO. The court also rejected
the argument that because RICO violations are premised on criminal
activity, complaints must establish probable cause in the absence of
prior criminal convictions.
The court went on to conclude that "a civil RICO plaintiff need not
145. id. at 503.
146. Id. at 499 n.48.
147. Id. at 504.
148. 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). The
Court's action was based on its rulings in Sedima and Haroco.
149. Id. at 515.
150. Id. at 516.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 518.
154. Id.
155. 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984).
156. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), afftd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
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allege or prove injury beyond any injury to business or property result-
ing from the underlying acts of racketeering."' 1 57 Thus, in Haroco, the
claim of excessive interest charges resulting from the allegedly fraudu-
lent scheme to overstate the prime rate constituted a cause of action
under civil RICO. Haroco also held that a plaintiff need only plead fraud
with sufficient specificity to put the defendants on fair notice of the
charges against them.
For the court in Haroco, the issue was not that of an ambiguous stat-
ute, but that of legislation that is deliberately and extraordinarily broad.
The court noted that "Congress deliberately chose to employ broad
terms which would defy judicial confinement."' 58 On this basis, the
court concluded the breadth of the statute was a deliberate policy choice
by Congress, which special standing and injury requirements would
frustrate because "[w]hen Congress deliberately chooses to unleash
such a broad statute on the nation, in the absence of constitutional
prohibitions, complaints must be directed to Congress rather than to the
courts." 1
59
The Haroco court also recognized that "the white-collar crime al-
leged in some RICO complaints against 'legitimate' businesses is in
some ways at least as disturbing as the bringing of RICO claims against
'legitimate and respected' defendants."' 16 0  For example, Bennett v.
Berg 1 6 1 involved a scheme whereby a group of businessmen, lawyers,
and accountants, acting in concert with an insurance company, allegedly
concocted a fraudulent plan to induce elderly persons to invest in a re-
tirement village. The defendants then took the retirement village to the
point of bankruptcy, thereby leaving the investors without assets or the
"life care" they had bargained for.
Two caveats, however, were set out in Haroco. First, the court con-
strued the "by reason of" language so as to impose a proximate cause
requirement; that is, the criminal conduct in violation of section 1962
must directly or indirectly have injured the plaintiff's business or prop-
erty. 16 2 Second, the "enterprise" and the "person" must be distinct;
therefore, an "enterprise" is an improper defendant in a section 1962(c)
action. 
1 63
B. The Criminal Conviction Defense
Another defense asserted against RICO claims is that defendants
must have been criminally convicted of RICO or the underlying predi-
cate acts as a condition precedent to civil liability. Most courts, however,
have rejected this defense, 164 holding, as succinctly expressed by one
157. Id. at 398.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 399.
160. 747 F.2d at 395 n.14.
161. 685 F.2d at 1056.
162. 747 F.2d at 398.
163. Id. at 402.
164. See, e.g., Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 257 (E.D.
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trial court, that "[i]f Congress had intended to require a prior conviction
it could have easily said so."'1 6 5 Yet, a few courts have nonetheless re-
quired a criminal conviction. 16 6 The major argument underlying this
requirement is that RICO is primarily a criminal statute proscribing
criminal conduct. Arguably, the criminal conviction requirement could
limit RICO's application to those situations for which Congress in-
tended to provide relief, thereby denying compensation to the victims of
certain types of criminal conduct.
C. Supreme Court Analysis
On July 1, 1985, the Supreme Court reversed Sedima in a five-to-
four decision. 167 Justice White, writing for the majority, looked to the
plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and the policy con-
siderations underlying it in rejecting the prior criminal conviction re-
quirement. The "racketeering enterprise injury" requirement was also
rejected by the Court, 168 which concluded it was "somewhat hampered
by the vagueness of that concept." The Court observed that the diffi-
culty of defining "racketeering injury" cautioned against imposing such
a requirement. 169 In rejecting the requirement, the Court relied heavily
on the plain language of the statute. As a result of the Court's decision,
a violation of section 1962(c) now requires: (1) conduct, (2) of an enter-
prise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.17
0
The Court's decision was based, in part, on the statute's liberal con-
struction clause. 17 1 The Court noted that the remedial purposes of
RICO was evidenced by its provision for private causes of action. 172 A
liberal interpretation of RICO, including section 1964(c), the Court ob-
served, was necessary to further the statutory goal of fashioning new
remedies for fighting crime.'
173
Although the Court recognized, as did the Second Circuit, that
most private suits are being brought against respected businesses and
not organized crime, the Court did not view this experience to be ajusti-
fication for limiting RICO. On the contrary, the Court noted that "[t]his
defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as written, and its
correction must lie with Congress."1
74
Mo. 1984); Southgate Bank v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7,601 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Mo.
1984).
165. ORA Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (D.S.C. 1984).
166. Bernstein v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, 598 F. Supp. 922, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1984); State of
New York v. O'Hara, 595 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
167. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
168. Id. at 3284.
169. Id. at 3285. As the Court stated: "If the defendant engages in a pattern of racke-
teering activity in a manner forbidden ... and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff
in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim .... There is no room in the statutory
language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement." d.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3286.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 3287. The Court recognized that the statute was evolving into something
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Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, noted that "[t]he Court's
interpretation . . .validates the federalization of broad areas of state
common law of frauds, and it approves the displacement of well-estab-
lished federal remedial provisions. We do not lightly infer a Congres-
sional intent to effect such fundamental changes."' 17 5 For Marshall, it
was clear that the principal target of RICO was the economic power of
racketeers and its detrimental effect on legitimate businesses. RICO was
to fill a gap in the existing civil and criminal statutes.
17 6
With the Supreme Court's affirmation of Haroco and reversal of
Sedima, the way is now clear, absent new judicial limitations on congres-
sional changes, for an expansive application of civil RICO. As long as
plaintiffs can allege two predicate offenses and a related enterprise, such
complaints will fall within the technical gambit of RICO.
III. THE BREADTH OF RICO
Considering the broadness of RICO's language and the liberal con-
struction accorded it, the number of situations in which RICO cases
have been brought, albeit quite often unsuccessfully, should not be sur-
prising. RICO was one of the causes of action asserted in IBM's com-
mercial bribery case against Hitachi. 177 In a corruption case, the pattern
of racketeering activity can be established by separate acts of bribery or
similar predicate acts. 178 Other specific applications include anti-
trust, 179 banking relationships (prime rate fraud), 180 bankruptcy, 181
commercial bribery, 18 2 consumer fraud, 1 83 corporate takeovers, 18 4 mat-
rimonial and family disputes, ' 8 5 municipal graft and corruption, 186 part-
nership fraud, 18 7 products liability, 18 8 securities fraud, 18 9 and co-op
quite different from the enactors' original conception. However, the reason for the ex-
traordinary uses of RICO is "primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses,
in particular the inclusion of wire, mail and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress
and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern' " of racketeering activity.
175. Id. at 3293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 3296 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 3288-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. See Comment, RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Available for Private Litigants, 21 CAL.
W.L. REV. 385, 386 n.8 (1985).
178. United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.
1978).
179. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D.
Alaska 1982) (purchasing contract bid rigging - followed criminal RICO action by United
States); Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1980) (demolition
contract bid rigging - followed criminal RICO prosecution by United States).
180. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 526 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1981),
overruled sub nom. Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11 th Cir. 1983).
181. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd
sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984).
182. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
183. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
184. See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
185. See, e.g., Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1003 (1984).
187. See, e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
188. See, e.g., Bast v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Camp-
bell v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
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conversions.1 90 RICO can also encompass cases of extortion or at-
tempted extortion'91 as well as corruption cases involving kickbacks,1
9 2
fraudulent work orders, tax abatements, and bribes for construction
contracts. 19 3 Among the officials involved in RICO actions have been
mayors, 19 4 the director of a redevelopment authority,
19 5 a sheriff,19 6
and a governor's office. 1 9 7 Typical defendants in civil RICO suits have
included such major companies as American Express, 19 8 E.F. Hutton &
Co., 1 9 9 Merrill Lynch,20 0 Bear Stearns & Co.,
2 0 1 Lloyd's of London, 20 2
Sears, Roebuck, 20 3 Prudential-Bache Securities,
20 4 Morgan Stanley, 20 5
General Motors,
20 6 Ford,20 7 and Browning-Ferris Industries.
20 8
IV. THE NATURAL RESOURCES APPLICATION
A. Possible Actions Under RICO
Up to now RICO has been of marginal importance in the natural
resources/environmental law area of practice with only a few cases hav-
ing been brought under its provisions. For instance, two RICO claims
were filed for remedial work at Love Canal2 0 9 and another suit was
brought to obtain damages to property arising out of the operation of a
189. See, e.g., Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.), dismissed as moot,
718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
190. See generally Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F.
Supp. 1408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (alleged failure of architects to discover defective conditions
in the conversion).
191. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
192. Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984).
193. United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983).
194. Id.
195. See generally United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 200 (E.D. Pa.) ("[A] single,
ongoing scheme to defraud by obtaining bribes or kickbacks, which involves a series of
unlawful acts, can establish a 'pattern' for purposes of RICO, and ... it is not necessary to
establish two or more totally independent criminal acts."), aff'd, 588 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.
1978).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 915 (1982) (sheriff was bribed to overlook gambling); see also United States v. Lee
Stoller Enters., Inc., 652 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1981) (defendants
charged with "selling" executive clemency and immunity from extradition through gover-
nor's office), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982).
198. Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
199. Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 606 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Roche v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D. Pa. 1984): Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F.
Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
200. Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 609 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1985).
201. Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
202. Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
203. Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1210 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
204. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1985).
205. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
206. Sellers v. General Motors Corp., 590 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
207. Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
208. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
209. See State of New York v. O'Hara, 595 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 779
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1985).
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hazardous waste landfill. 2 10 RICO was also asserted in a case where the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant deprived it of waste acid shipments
and of payments for disposal of the shipments. 2 1' In addition, one of
the largest trash hauling and waste removal companies was sued under
RICO for its use of unlawful and coercive means to attempt to gain con-
trol of the Western Pennsylvania market.
2 12
The most likely area of application of RICO is in the land use plan-
ning arena, particularly at the local level. Since fraud, kickbacks, and
corruption are very common in land development, it should be relatively
easy to allege a pattern of racketeering activity based on the predicate
acts of mail or wire fraud. Because RICO covers extortion and at-
tempted extortion, the victims of such conduct, which presumably in-
clude aggrieved residents opposed to the project, may now have a
powerful weapon with which to seek redress. Similarly, in real estate
development activities, RICO should be readily applicable in cases in-
volving partnership fraud, tax shelter scams, and similar nefarious activi-
ties. These situations also arise in other areas of development, such as
mineral exploration and timber harvests.
An example may help clarify RICO's applicability in the natural re-
sources/environmental law area of practice. Let us posit a dispute be-
tween a mineral extractor and a royalty holder. The dispute may well be
of a legitimate nature and would not ordinarily give rise to RICO litiga-
tion. The developer, however, may be deliberately shorting a large
number of landowners, hoping to succeed because of the landowners'
ignorance, unsophistication, or financial inability to bring a suit against
the developer. In this situation, such a pattern of conduct in relation to
the other property owners will buttress a RICO case based on mail or
wire fraud allegations.
Another area of possible RICO application would be in the toxic
waste area. An advantage of this approach would be the circumvention
of limitations involved in common law or other statutory approaches.
One such approach is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 13 The interest of provid-
ing various causes of action and theories for relief of injuries resulting
from hazardous waste has prompted Congress to enact CERCLA, com-
monly referred to as Superfund. As is common with controversial legis-
lative endeavors, the CERCLA is a product of tradeoffs and
compromises. The private cause of action is exceedingly narrow, being
limited to "response CoStS, ' 214 which are part of a "clean up" or re-
210. Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., 596 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.J. 1984) (defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss granted because plaintiffs did not allege the requisite RICO business or
property damage).
211. Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546 (D.S.C. 1984).
212. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
213. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982). CERCLA provides for a private cause of action. See
infra note 214 and accompanying text.
214. Respond or response means "remove, removal, remedy and remedial action." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1982).
[Vol. 63:3560
RICO IN NATURAL RESOURCE LA W
sponse to a hazardous waste problem. Thus, investigative costs and at-
torney's fees are not recoverable as "response costs." Only once a party
has begun to implement a government-authorized clean up program can
"response costs" be recovered. 2 15 Consequently, a private cause of ac-
tion for only damages is unavailable under CERCLA. 2 16
RICO may also be of great value in providing compensation to
landowners and residents affected by toxic waste dumps underlying
their property or leaching into their water supplies. The cause of action
may be premised on fraud or statutory violations of the facility's opera-
tor or, if it is an unauthorized facility, the "midnight dumper" or the
producers of the toxic wastes. For example, if the toxic waste operator
or producer filed false reports or made misrepresentations to the public
or governmental authorities, two predicate acts of mail or wire fraud
may be established.
RICO should also be applicable to real estate transactions. For in-
stance, in Engl v. Berg2 17 several investors alleged that the defendant
defrauded them through a series of real estate syndications and limited
partnerships organized to construct a commercial office building. The
investments proved worthless and the investors sued alleging breach of
fiduciary and contractual duties.
Similarly, a breach of fiduciary duty in a partnership may give rise to
RICO liability. For example, in USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy,
Inc.,2 18 the issuance of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, prohibit-
ing the defendants from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of
assets pending a resolution of the RICO claims. Relief was premised on
the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.
A more ingenious approach would require stretching RICO to its
limits by using the mail fraud predicate of multiple mailings arising out
of the same incident. This situation could occur when an invalid envi-
ronmental impact statement (EIS) has been mailed out on a proposed
project. Under many state statutes the developer (or proponent) of a
project is charged with developing the EIS. 2 19 Because the natural pro-
pensity of the developer is to "shade" the facts on behalf of the project,
it should not be difficult to, at least, allege "fraud" on the part of the
215. See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (D.C.
Fla. 1984). It has been held though that costs, such as medical testing could be included as
response cost." Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
216. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
217. 511 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
218. 689 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1982). The allegation was that the defendant had de-
frauded investors in a German limited partnership entity because of his fiduciary position.
The limited partnership was formed for the purposes of entering the coal business, con-
structing a tipple facility, and mining coal in Kentucky. In holding the promoter liable, the
court quoted from a much earlier Supreme Court decision, McCandless v. Furlaud, 296
U.S. 140, 164 (1935):
[B]reaches of the fiduciary duty make promoters accountable 'for everything that
comes to them as a result of the conspiracy in excess of consideration furnished
on their [the promoters] side' ..... Everything of profit arising out of the abused
relation must now be yielded up.
219. See, e.g., 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.10(c); 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 621.3(5)(iii).
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proponent. Even without relying on two separate mailings of a defective
EIS to establish the requisite pattern of racketeering activity, in many
instances the pattern could be established by showing a history of "defi-
cient" EIS's or other proscribed activities on the part of the devel-
oper.2 20 This option may be particularly attractive when a suit is
brought by surrounding landowners aggrieved by the proposed project,
such as a toxic waste recovery center. Injury could be shown through a
diminution of value of the owner's property. Although RICO does not
expressly provide for equitable relief,2 2 1 an EIS violation could perhaps
result in the issuance of an injunction.2 22 A RICO judgment would pro-
vide treble damages and reasonable attorneys fees to environmental
plaintiffs; relief that is generally unavailable under existing environmen-
tal law.
B. Caveats
Before bringing a RICO cause of action, it is important to consider
certain caveats. First, because of the hostility several courts have shown
towards RICO, forum shopping is advisable. It would be wise to ascer-
tain the prevailing attitude of the judges in the district and circuit where
the suit is to be filed. For example, it would avail a plaintiff little to bring
a tenuous RICO case in a jurisdiction where RICO is frowned upon. In
fact, plaintiff could be a double loser - both in terms of losing on the
merits and being subject to court costs and attorney fees if the trial court
viewed the case as frivolous.
2 23
Conversely, in a jurisdiction where RICO is not disfavored, a plain-
tiff would have a fair opportunity to prevail on the merits, subject only to
the normal vagaries of litigation. In addition, under these circumstances
a plaintiff would be in a better negotiating position for settlement
purposes.
A second caveat is that RICO may be modified at any time, either by
congressional or judicial action. Although Sedima eliminated some of
the judicially-created limitations on RICO, the opportunity for others
exist. Courts previously unsympathetic to RICO are not likely to change
their attitudes simply because of Sedima. In fact, as of this date two lower
courts have already followed Sedima's dicta in construing narrowly the
requisite two predicate acts of racketeering activity. 224 An alternative
220. It is likely that if the defendant is a large developer or a publicly owned corpora-
tion, that, at some point during the preceding ten years, the defendant could have run
afoul of the mail, wire, or securities fraud statutes.
221. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir.
1973) ("injunction is the vehicle through which the congressional policy behind NEPA can
be effectuated .... "); see also Note, Program Environmental Impact Statements: Review and Reme-
dies, 75 MICH. L. REV. 107, 132 (1976). But see Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo, 456 U.S.
306 (1982) (court is not required to grant injunctive relief in all circumstances).
223. See Rodarmor, Runaway RICO, 5 CAL. LAw. 44, 49 (1985). The sanctions are im-
posed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which allows courts to punish plain-
tiffs who bring frivolous actions.
224. See generally Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F.
[Vol. 63:3
RICO IN NA TURAL RESOURCE LA IV
might be, in a manner analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action,
to severely limit the new theory if existing remedies are adequate..
2 25
Even absent such judicial constraints, more subtle pressures can occur
through evidentiary and burden of proof rulings by the trial judge.
C. Conclusion
Subject to these caveats, it is clear that so long as a plaintiff can
meet certain minimal pleading requirements of a RICO claim, a cause of
action can be stated. As the Supreme Court held in Sedima, a RICO vio-
lation is established where a plaintiff is able to prove the existence of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 2 2 6 However, in re-
ality, so long as plaintiff can establish property or commercial damage
through the defendant's fraudulent conduct, no matter how loosely de-
fined or pled, and two separate predicate acts by the defendant, a plain-
tiff can press a RICO claim.
If the case law elsewhere is any indication, then absent new congres-
sional or judicial restraints, the application of RICO in the natural re-
sources/environmental law area of practice is limited only by the
ingenuity of counsel. Because of the pleading and equitable relief limi-
tations, RICO will probably not be used as frequently as NEPA has been
in restraining proposed developmental activities. However, RICO may
be extremely important in providing compensation for past and present
injuries to public and private interests in natural resources.
Supp. 1418, 1423 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (certified public accounting firm's dissemination of
an audit report is a "single, unified transaction"); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco,
Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. 11. 1985) (allegations of two specific acts to carry out
alleged kickback scheme insufficient to establish "pattern of racketeering activity").
225. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), where a state prisoner alleged that state
officials negligently lost a hobby kit he had ordered through the mails, thereby depriving
him of due process of law. The Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment in
the prisoner's favor. The Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment is not violated when a state official negligently deprives an individual of property,
provided the state makes available a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Parratt was sub-
sequently extended by the Supreme Court to apply to some intentional deprivations of
property. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
226. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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